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ABSTRACT: Cooperation in work settings goes through communicative 
interactions where colleagues need to reach a certain level of mutual understanding 
for coordinating their actions or finding negotiated decisions. Mutual understanding 
is complex because of the heterogeneity of the participants which makes the 
interpretations uncertain and unpredictable. We argue here that chronic 
cooperation is still more complex because the memory of the previous cooperative 
interactions is an additional source of difference between the cognitive contexts of 
the participants. We studied the memory of cooperative interactions in four different 
collaborative work settings. The analysis indicates a massive forgetting of the verbal 
content and a greater remembering of the relational positionings, interactional 
structures and emotions.  
RÉSUMÉ Le travail coopératif se réalise à travers des interactions communicatives 
qui permettent d’atteindre un certain niveau de compréhension mutuelle pour 
coordonner les actions ou aboutir à des décisions négociées. La compréhension 
mutuelle est complexe de par l’hétérogénéité des participants qui entraine 
l’imprédictabilité et l’incertitude des interprétations. Nous posons ici que la 
coopération chronique est encore plus complexe parce que le souvenir des 
interactions coopératives précédentes est une source supplémentaire de différence 
entre les contextes cognitifs des participants. Nous avons étudié le souvenir 
d’interactions coopératives dans quatre situations collaboratives différentes. 
L’analyse indique un oubli massif du contenu verbal et un rappel plus aisé des 
positionnements relationnels, des structures interactionnelles et des émotions. 
KEY WORDS: chronic interactions, cooperation history, memory, mutual 
understanding, cognitive context, discursive content, relational positioning, 
interactional structure. 
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1. Introduction 
We argue in this paper that the complexity of cooperation in work settings where 
people need to communicate is partly due to the heterogeneity and uncertainty of the 
interpretation of the verbal exchanges by the participants, and that the memory of 
the previous exchanges  in chronic cooperation increases this complexity.  
 
We will consider the interactional part of the cooperative work and the 
complexity of reaching some kind of mutual understanding when working together .  
Interaction is the core of cooperative work, it is what fundamentally transforms 
the work from individually performed to cooperatively performed; there is 
cooperative work when people need to act together, to act with each other, to «inter-
act», and then need to communicate. 
Our research focuses on the socio-cognitive dynamics of communicative 
interactions in work settings, and more particularly on how people, through 
communication, share a common representation of the problem and situation to be 
able to cooperate efficiently [CAH 98a] [CAH 98c]. The sharing of a « sufficiently » 
common representation is very complex.  
We already know that there are various levels of mutual understanding and that 
each participant of a dialogue may interpret the situation and the communicative 
exchanges  in different ways, but we do not know if this difference increases with 
on-going time and when memory has faded.  
 
One factor which may increase the complexity of the cooperation is that most of 
the time it is historic, following previous exchanges with the same participants. At 
work, but not only, most of the interactions are « chronic » : we work and 
communicate with colleagues during a more or less formal work meeting, and then 
later on, a day, a week or a month after, we work with them again, on the basis of 
what we said and did together during the previous meeting. We then suppose a priori 
that we share a memory of this common interaction that we had jointly.  
 
The objective here is to have a clearer idea of what is recalled of a cooperative 
interaction after a while, and what is the level of homogeneity between people in 
this recall. The point is to better know what is the shared memory of the previous 
interaction in chronic cooperation.  
 
We will show first how communication in itself is a complex process which 
requires sophisticated interpretation mechanisms from the interlocutors and how 
mutual understanding is uncertain in this regard. Our point is that there are even 
more discrepancies between the interlocutors later on, when they meet several days 
or several months later to continue their collaboration on the basis of the previous 
verbal interaction; this temporal evolution of the supposed "common ground" (as 
called by [CLA 91] acquired during the cooperative interaction has not been 
questioned much and we want to address this issue by analyzing different data 
concerning the memory of cooperative interactions. 
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2. Heterogeneity, unpredictability and  uncertainty in cooperative 
communications 
When people interact, Schütz [SCH 87] says that they tend to believe from a 
naive point of view that they are globally identical. This is what he calls "the illusion 
of reciprocity". This thesis of the reciprocal perspectives states that the common 
thought goes over the differences of individual perspectives via two basic 
idealizations: the idealization of the interchangeability of the points of view (the 
other sees what I see the same way) and the idealization of the congruency of the 
relevancy systems, which consists in minoring the importance of the biographical 
differences between oneself and the other. 
As stated by Shütz the similarity is only an illusion ; each one is unique and 
differences in behaviour, interpretation, belief, emotion, way of thinking, etc, are 
enormous, even between the most proximate persons. Consequently, when we 
communicate, "all sorts of risks are taken, assumptions  and guesses are made" [SPE 
86] ; we are never sure at which level our interlocutor has understood what we 
meant, and we never know if we « really » understand what he means. We share a 
representation at a certain level but this level maybe very low sometimes when we 
think it is high. Mutual understanding is then uncertain. 
Understanding an interlocutor is uncertain first because language is polysemic 
and its interpretation is situated ; pragmatics has shown clearly how it depends on 
the context of its production [SEA 69] [MOE 94], especially in the case of indirect 
speech acts where the illocutionary force varies with the context ; for instance «can 
you open your book? » is an order  if produced by the teacher in a class-room but it 
is a real question about a possibility if produced to someone who has a broken arm.  
Possible interpretations are plurial if we look at the detailed interpretation and 
not just at the very global meaning; the meaning of any utterance is potentially 
different for every person. For instance, when I say "I would like to speak English 
fluently", what does it mean for me and for you? will you think I am very far from 
that? will you think of the reasons why I need to speak English? what will be your 
representation of ‘fluently’? will it be the same as mine ? will it mean for instance : 
to be at ease to communicate on any topic in this language ? or to talk in a way that 
one cannot know I am not a native english speaker ? Also the intention meant by « I 
would like » : will you understand it as « it’s one of my priorities and I work hard 
for that » or « it’s an unrealistic dream » ? ... We can see with this simple example 
how what I have in mind when I say these phrases may be far from what you are 
thinking or have understood. 
We can see sometimes disastrous consequences in the variety of possible 
interpretations in cooperative work. Decortis & Pecheux [DEC] described how, 
during a shift change over in a nuclear power plant, the new team misunderstood the 
following message given by the team about to leave:"the pump is unavailable", and 
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then created a pump dysfunction, mainly because of the potential ambiguity of the 
term « available ».  
It clearly shows how the ambiguity of a single term may engender important 
problems in coordination. 
We can only have a vague idea of the way the colleagues will grasp a certain 
representation of the situation at hand or of the discourse we hold. Mutual 
understanding is then a complex process which is largely imperfect. 
"We assume that communication is governed by a less-than-perfect heuristic (...) 
Failures in communication are to be expected: what is mysterious and requires 
explanation is not failure but success" [SPE 86]. 
This uncertainty lets hazard, fuzziness and risk be part of the cooperation, and it 
complexifies it by the fact that no clear calculation may be done about the effects of 
our communicative behaviour. The interlocutor remains mysterious and the system 
formed between the different actors of a cooperative situation is unpredictible. 
Anticipation is consequently limited. 
Another factor which increases complexity is the high interdependance within 
the actors of a verbal interaction. In a conversation (for instance in work meetings) 
the change of locutor is extremely rapid and often one has not even finished his/her 
utterance than the other has begun a new sentence. At each turn-taking, the mental 
state of each participant is modified and their representation of the cooperative state 
is then constantly evolving. The system is unstable and constantly changing, each 
actor undergoing the rhythm of the other and needing to adapt to this unpredictible 
temporal development.  
Heterogeneity and interdependance makes the interaction system globally 
unpredictible for the observer and for the actors (except in extremely stereotyped 
situations of interaction). This unpredictability is the core of the complexity of any 
system showing chaotic behavior [PAV 01]. 
3. How the memory of the interactions history increases the heterogeneity in 
chronic cooperation 
The context is important in the communication process, and the memory of 
previous interactions is part of the context in chronic cooperation ; consequently the 
evolution of the individual representations of the interaction after a while will have 
an effect on the next work meeting; though we observe a lack of studies on this issue 
of the memory of cooperative interactions. 
3.1. The role of the context in cooperative interactions 
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The context is the perception and knowledge used for the communicative 
purpose, or more generally for the action purpose. 
According to Sperber & Wilson [SPE 86], the dynamic construction of contexts 
for mutual understanding is conducted by a search for relevance, i.e. by a search for 
many cognitive effects and few cognitive efforts ; they also proposed the notion of 
mutual cognitive environment which is larger than the context since it corresponds 
to what the participants can potentially perceive or infer during the communicative 
moment.  
"A context is a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer's assumptions 
about the world (...) a context is not limited to information about the immediate 
physical environment or the immediately preceeding utterances: expectations about 
the future, scientific hypotheses or religious beliefs, anecdotal memories, general 
cultural assumptions , beliefs about mental state of the speaker, may all play a role 
in interpretation" [SPE 86]. 
 
We have developed in [CAH 96] this notion of cognitive context in the 
cooperation dynamics and we showed how the illusion to share a similar cognitive 
context may lead to misunderstandings in cooperative situations. We defined it as 
the transitory representations which are constructed or activated during the 
interaction for the purpose of mutual understanding and decision-making, and which 
concern : 
- the spatio-temporal environment,  
- the psycho-social situation,  
- the task at hand, 
- the previous interactions between  the interlocutors ; this last point (that we call 
here the cooperation memory) corresponds to the memory of what happened during 
the previous meetings, what were the decisions taken, the solutions proposed, the 
arguments for negotiating, etc. It is an important part of the context used for 
communicating during chronic cooperation. 
3.2. Chronic cooperation and memory 
If uncertainty and unpredictability complexify the present of a cooperative 
interaction, in a following interaction the work of the memory increases 
heterogeneity and uncertainty. 
If the actors reach a sufficient degree of mutual understanding for the needs of 
the present cooperation , what will remain after a while and will it be enough ? 
What is memorized of the past interaction, of the decisions taken in a previous 
meeting, of the reasons for these decisions, of what was agreed on, of what was 
argued by the various participants? 
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This issue is essential if we consider that cooperation is most of the time made of 
chronic interactions, that it is developed in large time-spans in a repetitive manner 
and that it has most of the time a past history that we can call the "cooperative 
history". This point of view which includes chronicity and then history of a 
cooperation process necessarily also implies the memorization processes. 
Memory is different for each one, first because nobody leaves the same event 
with the same point of view ; differences in life history necessarily lead to 
differences in memorized information. 
It is then legitimate to wonder what will become in the future the common 
ground which has been built during the interaction. If, as stated by Clark & Brennan 
[CLA 91], during a cooperative interaction the contributor and the partners mutually 
believe that the partners have understood what the contributor meant to a criterion 
sufficient for the current purpose, what about this grounding criterion in the future? 
One believes that the partner has understood even if it is not always true, and one 
tends to believe that the partner will memorize the same way , which is still less 
probable. 
At Schütz illusion of reciprocity we would add that the following cooperative 
interaction will take place with the implicit and simplificatory hypothesis that the 
other one has memorized just like we do. This basic hypothesis will function by 
default, if the other one is not identified as very different. 
 
Figure 1. Cooperation history 
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This evolution of the information which has been memorized in cooperative 
interactions has consequences for the studies on Design Rationale [MOR 94]. These 
studies aim at tracing and storing the history of the decisions taken collaboratively in 
various projects (often industrial design projects) for reusing previous solutions, for 
avoiding previous errors or for improving the communication in the team. 
3.2. State of the art 
This issue of the memorization of cooperative interactions has not yet been 
studied. 
Much has been done in the domain of texts memorization which are read by 
subjects in experimental conditions [DEN 84] and it gives interesting information 
about the way verbal material is memorized, using scripts [SCH 77], schemata 
[RUM 75] or story structure [MAN 77] for instance. We can wonder if interaction 
memory is also helped by some sort of interactional schemata. Though a 
fundamental difference is that text reading is a solitary activity whereas verbal 
interaction is a collaborative process ; the subjects are not alone with their mental 
activity but must also integrate the rhythm of the other and all the surprises of the 
interaction, all the unexpected which must be dealt with very quickly (like when the 
other is asking a question, disagreeing, etc) ; in reading a text we have the possibility 
to manage the time for thinking and re-reading. During an interaction the 
participants also have to deal with the relational aspect of the situation, the other is 
physically present and it renders the management of the faces (or social images) 
necessary for protecting a social harmony [GOF 59], [GOF 67].  
Another area which could inform the souvenir of cooperative interactions is the 
domain of the autobiographical memory, or surveys, where researchers study the 
way various events are remembered in the long-term [SCH 94]. The difference here 
is that the events recorded are not verbal interactions and that the level of detail of 
the recall is generally low: it is for instance the recall of the frequency of 
engagement in some determined daily activity, like Wagenaar [WAG 86] did, during 
six years, writing each day two occuring events, precising who was involved, where 
and when it took place, what happened, and its degree of frequency, emotional 
implication and agreability ;  or the recall of the number of cigarettes smoked , or 
the dietary habits [SCH 94], which are compared with the actual behavior to observe 
the memory reliability and the effect of emotions, delays or modes of questioning on 
this reliability. 
But by now we did not find experimental  studies looking at what is recalled 
from an interactional event. 
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We know that memorization of past events, interactional or not, is partial; but we 
do not yet know much about the reasons for this forgetting. Baddeley [BAD 90] 
presents different possibilities :  
- weakening, erosion, degradation of the trace, just like a chain of mountain 
erodes,  
- fragmentation and loss of some elements,  
- interference and covering by the following traces  
- impossibility of recovering. 
Other authors now even reconsider the idea of a mnesic storage of any kind 
[ROS 88] and propose that the memory is re-constructed each time. The question 
then remains opened and we will consider here the forgetting process in Baddeley’s 
opened frame. 
4. Case study : memories of collective design of advertisement 
 
We will develop a study we conducted about the memory of collaborative design 
dialogs, and we will also mention three other situations where the memory of work 
interactions is involved. All these situations of cooperation are highly 
communicative : the verbal exchanges during the work activity are frequent, central 
for the achievement of the task and not too standardized.  
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Work situation Recall delay Number of subjects’ 
recall 
Number of 
participants in 
the interaction 
slogan design 
interaction 
10 mn 18 2 
idem 18 months 11 2 
scientific 
meeting 
8 months 2 18 
administrative 
meeting 
(Sanchiz) 
1 month 6 9 
agent-client 
interaction 
10 mn 1 2 
Figure 2. Characteristics of the situations studied 
 
We studied the immediate and long-term memory of cooperative interactions 
where people design advertisements. The issue was to know about the evolution of 
the supposed shared background of chronic cooperation and then to have results 
about what is the remaining representation of cooperative interactions held by the 
participants after a while. 
4.1. The corpus : design interactions and interviews 
We needed to get several interactions in rather similar conditions in order to 
draw some generalizations. The work situation is then « provoked » in the sense that 
we asked people to cooperate in designing a slogan and, after a while, to remember 
what happened during this cooperative interaction. 
We gathered three types of data in chronological steps : 
- The slogan design interactions : nine groups of two students in advertising and 
communication were asked to design a slogan of one or two lines which satisfied 
both partners ; they interacted by phone (for us to have a focus on verbal 
interactions), and they did not know the study was about memory of dialogues. The 
objects to be advertised were either paper-clips, earplugs, umbrellas or cotton buds. 
The interactions lasted more or less half an hour and were audio-recorded. These 
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nine interactions were similar in the task (slogan design), in the type of partners 
involved (similar level of competency), and in the setting. 
- The immediate interviews : in the second step we had immediate interviews 
with all the participants to study the short-term recall of the design dialogues. 
- The delayed interviews : in the third step we performed interviews eighteen 
months later with eleven of the participants (the others were not available anymore), 
to study their long-term recall of the design interactions.  
All the interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. We then analysed the 
remembering of the design dialogues by comparing the recall as observed in the 
interviews and the effective design interactions. 
4.2. Remembering of the design dialogues 
4.2.1. Immediate memories of the design dialogues 
After the interaction we conducted immediate interviews with each partner 
separately, a few minutes after the end of the interaction, and asked them to tell us 
anything that he/she recovered from this interaction. After this spontaneous recall 
which consisted in a summary of what they said during the dialogue, they were 
questioned using dialogue cues to help the memorization with a technic of priming 
[BAD 90] : the interviewer had listened to the dialogue and taken notes, and could 
then ask for instance "when you talked about {concept x} what did you say?", "what 
was the reaction of your interlocutor when you said {utterance y}", or "who 
proposed the idea {z}"? (even if the subject had not mentioned yet this concept, 
utterance or idea). 
Finally, more general questions were asked, like "do you think you've had 
different roles? if yes, which ones?", "have you had any difficulties of mutual 
understanding or of agreement?". 
The analysis (consisting in comparing the interaction and its immediate recall) 
indicates that, in the immediate recall, almost everything remains accessible by the 
subjects (not verbatim but rephrased), and the priming cues are very helpul for the 
recall. The ideas they exchanged during the dialogue and the slogans they found 
were most of the time easily retrieved. We can observe some lapse of memory but 
no transformation and imaginary constructions in this immediate recall. 
What is told spontaneously by the subjects is the content of the interaction, what 
they told each other: the topics and ideas they exchanged about the advertisement, 
the different slogans they proposed and the one they finally chose, the visual scenes 
they eventually talked about to complement their slogan; sometimes the author, that 
is the one who proposed the idea, is also spontaneously mentioned.  
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The only two persons who had some difficulty recovering the chosen slogan 
were those who were more passive in finding it, and who, during the interaction,  
found ideas but not verbal slogans. 
With cues helping the memory of the dialogue, the subjects easily retrieved the 
misunderstandings, the disagreements , the arguments which were exchanged (not 
verbatim), the author of such or such idea and the role that each participant had 
during the interaction. 
Concerning the author of a proposition (of idea, image, slogan, term...) the 
subjects sometimes forgot that they were at the origin of an idea, or thought that they 
were the author when they were not ; in these cases the author, in the rapidity of the 
verbal exchanges, has become a collective author, a "we have found that together", 
even if, during the recorded interaction, the author could clearly be identified. 
For instance in one of the design interactions, Ann had defended her idea of 
comparing before and after the use of an earplug but she does not remember it in the 
short-term recall, and says « I don’t know who said that... ». 
4.2.2. Long-term memory of the design dialogues 
One year and a half after the design interaction, eleven subjects had been 
interviewed again to study the long-term memory of these design dialogues. 
A specific methodology of interview has been used because of the difficulty of 
the long-term recall which necessitates a careful and delicate way of interviewing 
the person so that the questioning facilitates the access to this distant design 
interaction, and not entrave too much the delicate mental course that the subject will 
have to follow to let this past experience come to his mind again. This methodology 
is the Explicitation Interview ("Entretien d'Explicitation" in french) and has been 
developed by Vermersch, a researcher in cognitive psychology who develops a 
phenomenological perspective on human activities [VER 94], [VER 98]. 
This interview technique aims at accessing and describing the subjective 
experience of a past activity, mental or externalized. It is based on the principle that 
the interviewed person is brought in evocation of his past activity and recovers a 
vivid memory of it ; for that, the interviewer focuses him on his activity at a specific 
moment in time and space, and questions him about the various sensorial modes of 
experience (what was heard, seen, felt...). Several other interview techniques are 
used that were developped in [VER 94], aiming at keeping the subjects in touch with 
their experience, getting them to describe more completely what was their activity 
and what happened without influencing their recall (asking for instance opened 
questions with a minimum of propositional content). The subject recovers then the 
past experience in a more complete, personalized and detailed manner, not in a 
distant and abstract way.  
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In the second step, when the subject did not recall anything more, we also used 
the priming technique with cues of the past dialogue (see § 4.2.1). 
The interviews lasted between half an hour and more than an hour. 
The frame of analysis we used was the following [CAH 98b] ; we differentiated 
several types of processes : 
- a recall, more or less precise, of an element of the past interaction; 
- a recognition; with the help of cues of the interaction the person remembers an 
element of the interaction (verbal proposition, laugh, interlocutor, place...) and can 
develop it. 
- a forgetting; the subject does not, during the interview, remember an element of 
the interaction when the interviewer asks about it.  
- a construction, when the subject adds some element which actually did not 
happen during the interaction. 
 
The categories of elements that we differentiated as objects of the remembering 
after a detailed analysis of the data, were : 
- the discursive content, 
- the authors, 
- the structure of the interaction, 
- the structure of the slogan, 
- the situational context, 
- the emotional atmosphere. 
The analysis indicates that, eighteen months after the design interaction, these 
different elements of the interaction are not equally remembered, and that inter-
individual differences exist. Our presentation will go from the more difficult recall 
to the less difficult, with several extracts of interviews. 
 
4.2.2.1. Massive forgetting of discursive contents and authors 
The interaction element which appears to be the most difficult to remember after 
this long period of time is the discursive content of the exchanges, that is the topics 
and ideas developed, the arguments exchanged, the utterances and the lexical items 
proposed for the slogans. 
During the immediate interviews, the discursive content was spontaneously and 
immediately described by the subjects, but they cannot retrieve it after a while. 
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All of them do not remember much of the verbal content of the dialogue at the 
beginning of the interview, and only some of them finally retrieve some ideas which 
were developed during the interaction or some parts of the slogan they found. It is 
mainly this discursive content which leads to inter-individual differences. 
We can see below how B recalls vaguely an idea of advertisement that they 
discussed eighteen months ago, and in the whole interview
2
 he cannot remember 
more about the content linked to the solution they discussed during their half an hour 
discussion:  
B : « maybe the final slogan he told it, maybe it was me, maybe it was a mix 
of both... what I know, I know that it was quite funny... that there is a granny, 
now I think of a granny, well.. we talked about a small girl... also a dialogue 
between the granny and her granddaughter, but it’s vague, really really 
vague... I could not remember the slogan.. well maybe with a bit of reflection 
but I ‘ve been thinking about it for a while but no... 
I : hmm hmm then a granny and her granddaughter... 
B : a dialogue, a conversation between two persons, I’m quite sure about 
that ». 
 
Actually, for designing their slogan for cotton buds, they discussed about having 
a mammy discussing with a small child (it was a boy) and who could not hear him. 
The following example indicates that an idea which was largely developed 
during the creative dialogue (A said « I think also of a tramp » and then B was 
imagining a scene where there was a tramp who was entering in a supermarket, not 
to buy wine but cotton buds for cleaning his ears) is not at all accessible anymore, 
not even by recognition when the interviewer, at the end of the interview, says it 
again: 
I :  « would you have talked about a tramp, a down-and-out ? 
B : well it doesn’t remind me of anything, no I don’t think so... (in a low 
voice) a tramp... » 
We observed that the cues in the dialogue are very helpful in a short-term recall 
but generally not in a long-term recall; though in the following example, an 
exception occurs and, after a long interview without any recall of the discursive 
content, three slogans are proposed to the subject who recognizes, through a feeling 
of familiarity which surprises him, the one they actually found during the 
interaction. 
                             
2
 All the extracts of interviews and dialogues are translated from french. 
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I (proposing three possible slogans) : « ‘for a quite and sane sleep, use the 
earplugs X’ ...  ‘for a silent and sane sleep, use the earplugs X’ ...  ‘for an easy 
and quite sleep, use the earplugs X’... 
A : it would be rather ‘quite and sane’  
I : rather ‘quite and sane’... 
A : yes (silence) I would be more inclined to this one well (silence) I don’t 
know ; I find it more familiar than the others... but it’s not at all what I had in 
mind, at least what I thought I remembered, so well... 
I : ‘silent’ maybe ? 
A : ‘silent’ (silence)...no... ‘quiet and safe’ yes, at least maybe we tried 
something around this idea.» 
We can observe here how the utterances which have been pronounced one year 
ago may still awaken mental echoes, even when the subject is surprised because he 
would have waited for another type of utterance, and then does not control what 
came back. 
We only observed two subjects who could have a rather precise remembrance of 
some of the ideas or words used in the slogan, but only after a long time of 
interview. 
Not only the discursive content of the dialogue is generally forgotten but also the 
author of the ideas, topics and slogans which were discussed before.  
When some content is recalled, its author is generally forgotten and either the 
subjects only mention the collective author  in terms of "we", or they rationally infer 
who was the author (correctly or not) ; with on-going time, the discourse is recalled 
as produced collectively with no more differentiation between the partners.  
Rationalizations to infer who was the author are the inferences made by the 
subjects based on their knowledge of the partners (their tastes, their tendencies...) to 
find out who was the author of an idea. As described by [GRU 97], the trace in 
memory of the signs and of their meaning has faded, and one tries to assign this 
trace to a locutor, on the basis of the cues that it conveys.  
The representation of the partners leads to an inferential recovery [HER 94] and 
it is a very different process from a direct recovery. These inferential recoveries are 
a source of error because then the subject hasn't a vivid memory of the event but 
makes a rational hypothesis about its probable development. 
 
4.2.2.2. Remembrance of the structure of the interaction and slogan 
The verbal content of what was said during the interaction is generally forgotten 
but we observed a much more frequent remembrance of the structure of what was 
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said eighteen months ago : structure of the slogan and pragmatic structure of the 
interaction. 
Sometimes, the subject does not recover the verbal content of the slogan but 
he/she can recall, as below, the structure of the slogan, its rhythm, its length, etc. 
For instance : 
I : (I suggest a possible slogan) « do you think you found that ?  
B : no no no, no, not that at all 
I : not at all, it’s not at all what you found ? 
B : no no not at all... it was rather long, it was... 
I : hm hm 
B : yes, it was... I don’t know... it was not, it was not a a phrase of three or 
four words, it was at least five or six. »  
This recall of the form of the slogan is correct since the effective slogan was ‘the 
noise annoys you, take your earplugs with you’3. 
The memory of the interactional structure is particularly striking; it is often 
recalled and corresponds to the structural development of the design interaction, 
with a description by the subjects of : 
- moments when they got blocked on a fixed idea,  
- or conflictual moments when they disagreed,  
- or the type of evaluation they gave an idea,  
- or the number of slogans proposed and the rhythm of the propositions, 
- or the way they reached an agreement and concluded. 
These interactional structures are remembered independently of the verbal 
content of the exchanges and if we asked the subjects what they disagreed on, or 
which was the idea on which they got blocked, they are unable to answer. 
This « interactional structure » corresponds generally to the temporal succession 
of moves as they were described by [SIN 75] or "big speech acts" ([SEA 92] defines 
them as being composed of several basic speech acts , and gives the example of a 
justification) linked to the design task (like proposal or absence of proposal, 
justification, positive or negative evaluation, etc);  the actor
4
 of this kind of 
illocutionary act is often specified but its propositional content is forgotten.  
                             
3  in french : ‘le bruit vous agace? emportez vos boules Quiès!’ 
4  We see how the author of a verbal content is often forgotten whereas the actor of an 
illocutionary act is more often remembered. 
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B : « I think that we proposed something and then well... we stayed one or 
two minutes saying « yes yes yes maybe it’s okay », and then actually we 
probably did not find anything better and during/ we needed at least one minute 
each to say that once more it was okay, and that we will stop there » 
This is correct since the dialogue ended with the two women expressing their 
moderate enthusiasm by phrases like : « it’s not that bad (« ça peut se faire » in 
french)..... anyway by now we couldn’t find something better... it’s more or less 
correct » during twenty turn-takings. 
In the two following extracts, the subjects describe how they had a fixed idea 
that their partner did not like, but they cannot describe the content of the utterance or 
of the idea: 
A : « we proposed many things, well, me and her, but some of the ideas did 
not work.. I think that I had a rather fixed idea of something I had set my heart 
on, let’s say that I considered judicious, we discussed about it but I can’t 
remember what it was about  
I : it was more an image or it was more/ 
A : no it had to do with words which... she proposed something else and she 
was trying to convince me that it was not good (...) me I was also trying to 
convince her (...) well it has been rather brief, after we went on something else 
and then we proposed several things connected to the previous situation where I 
had an idea that suited me but less Nathalie, then there was that and after we had 
maybe, well, four proposals and we kept one of them... but sometimes it was 
only on parts of utterances, on the beginning... the end suited us but the 
beginning didn’t, or... » 
Actually during the dialogue, A had the idea of presenting someone before and 
after the use of the earplugs but B did not agree and thought it was better to address 
the slogan only to the people who are nervous; after, B proposed a compromise with 
the idea of a slogan with a comparison before/after but addressed to nervous people ; 
then A and B proposed several slogans (more than seven in fact) with two parts 
(before/after) by changing one part or the other and finally chose « not to suffocate 
to death under your pillow and to spend the night of your dreams, use the 
earplugs »
5
. We recognize in the real dialogue the recall made by A of the 
interactional structure even if she does not remember the verbal content. 
The following extract indicates also a very precise remembrance of the 
positionings of the two participants (who found a slogan, what was the reaction of 
the other etc) but with no indication at all about the verbal content. 
A : « each time she was giving me an argument, I reflected on it, I was 
thinking : well yes it’s true, maybe she wasn’t wrong but... since we had found a 
                             
5  In french :  ‘pour ne pas mourir étouffé sous votre oreiller et passer la nuit de vos rêves, 
utilisez les boules quiès’ 
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slogan at the start... I think, I’m not sure but I think that it’s me who proposed the 
first utterance... then after we were a bit bloked on this utterance because she, 
she did not agree, but since it was me who had found it , I was in trouble to get 
out of this idea, I was in trouble... » 
Actually A was clearly blocked on her first idea « the cotton-wool blud, it 
changes your life » 
6
 that B did not find terrific but finally they adopted it because B 
could not find any other slogan (A did not help her by the way she was fixed on her 
own proposal). 
The subjects could remember this pragmatic structure which included the 
positionings, the agreements and conflicts, the roles of each partner and the 
development of the design solution with the different phases and the global way it 
happened ; but they were most of the time unable of remembering what was the 
discourse, the arguments, the proposals of slogans, terms or ideas, that is, all the 
verbal content of the interaction. In Watzlawick & al.’s terms [WAT 67] the level of 
the relation is remembered when the level of the content is forgotten. In Searle’s 
terms [SEA 69] the illocutionary acts are more salient eighteen months after the 
interaction than the propositional content. 
Some typical structures of this type of interaction are probably memorized in 
long-term memory, for instance, in the form of schemata, i.e. organized and 
memorized structures which integrate our knowledge and anticipations on various 
aspects of the world [BAR 32], [RUM 75], [SCH 94] they may help the recall of  the 
interactional structures described above : one known schema may be, for instance, 
that there is someone who proposes an idea or a slogan and then the other agrees or 
not ; but the fact that they got blocked on a fixed idea is less stereotyped, and in all 
of the previous examples we could see that they did not remember only a general 
and stereotyped schema but instanciated schemata with the right variables in it, 
describing the right chronology, the right actor, etc. It is not general stereotyped 
schemata  which are recalled here but the very specific progress of the past 
interaction. 
The roles, when they are clearly differentiated, are precisely recalled; we can see 
below how A and B (not design partners) recall correctly that their partner was the 
one who found the verbal slogans and that their role was, for A, to imagine scenes 
visually and, for B, to evaluate the slogans proposed by the partner: 
A: well otherwise it was rather balanced you know. He mainly found the 
slogans, me I couldn’t, well that... and me I was seeing mainly the aspect of the 
TV advertisement/ I was imagining the avertisement in my head. Well, I was 
proposing that and after he had a slogan that I loved immediately. It was like that 
from the beginning to the end. 
I : and otherwise, the general impression from this conversation ? 
                             
6 In french : « le coton-tige ça vous change la vie » 
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B : well I know that he found the slogans and me I said if I agreed or not, and 
why I agreed and why I didn’t, we talked about that, we told our opinions 
In the following extracts of interviews, A and B who were designing the slogan 
together, correctly remember their asymmetrical roles: A was clearly the leader and 
did not listen much to B’s proposals. 
A : I had the impression to lead a bit the interaction... to have succeeded in 
imposing/ I don’t know but, to get my point of view developed 
B : we generally agreed but I think I was a bit influenced by what he said , 
more than the opposite 
The recall may also be here facilitated by stereotypical roles of leader and 
follower in a dialogue but still it is correctly instanciated and in the first example, 
the complementary roles described are more rare : the verbal slogan producer and 
the other who visualizes the scene. 
 
4.2.2.3. Easy recall of the context and emotional atmosphere 
The basic frame of the interaction (i.e. where was the action taking place, which 
action was carried out and with who) is easily remembered by most of the eleven 
subjects; it includes: 
- the main task, i.e. the fact that they needed to find a slogan for earplugs, 
umbrella etc;  
- the interlocutor, who was someone they could recognize during the interaction 
because he/she was in the same section of their technical university;  
- the place where they stood during the interaction, the room, the place where 
they sat. 
The emotions and global atmosphere are also the first elements of the past 
interaction which are easily remembered : the laughs during the interaction or the 
tension, worry or surprise at the beginning, when the other is perceived as 
comforting because of the complicity, or as disturbing because of the image he/she 
can have after the interaction. 
B : I thought : oh that’s going to be difficult ; when I heard Solene’s voice, I 
panicked less 
A : there has been a short period of embarrassment, we did not know each 
other very well and we were certainly a bit shy... to begin the dialogue it was  not 
so easy... I remember I wondered what she would think of me after.. 
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4.3. Conclusion of this study 
We observed that, immediately after the design dialogue, the subjects report the 
details of the verbal content, even if they may have already forgotten who was the 
author of the discourse. In the long-term, eighteen months later, the surprising point 
is that they have forgotten most of the verbal content of the exchanges but they can 
remember the interactional or illocutionary structure.  
We found inter-individual differences, essentially concerning the recall of the 
content ; some do not remember anything, some remember a bit after a while. 
Globally the subjects are prudent and they very rarely construct something which 
did not happen ; they tend to be aware of what they have forgotten. 
We must consider the fact that the verbal content may be more difficult to 
remember than the interactional structure and the roles because schemas cannot help 
its recall. But we saw that even the priming cues of the dialogue (like « did you talk 
about topic Y ? ») do not help the long-term recollection of the propositional 
content.  
These results, based on eleven subjects remembering, have few quantitative 
validity even if we observed a homogeneity in the difficulty of recalling the content 
and inter-individual differences in the quality of the recall ; this study must then be 
generalized with different types of interactive situations in different work settings. 
One  could also argue that this situation of design interactions is not totally natural 
for the subjects and that consequently the content which is exchanged about the task 
is not so important to them; but we will see how we find similar results in situations 
of real work settings. 
5. Other cases of cooperative interaction memories 
5.1. Memory of decision-taking and informative meetings 
5.1.1. Recalls of a scientific meeting 
We also analysed two recalls of another type of cooperative interaction : a large 
meeting with eighteen colleagues from the same scientific laboratory which lasted 
two days. The objective of this meeting was to inform the colleagues about the 
present and future topics of research of each person, and to find common issues and 
a structuring of the scientific topics developed in the laboratory. At the beginning of 
the meeting, each of the eighteen members presented their scientific issues in ten or 
fifteen minutes, and then an informal exchange occured where everyone participated 
to define the common concepts and the new structuring in two or three main 
scientific axis. The meeting has been audio-recorded. 
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Eight months later, we interviewed two of the participants (that we will call S1 
and S2) to study their memory of the meeting, and asked them : « can you tell me 
what do you recall of this work meeting, anything that comes back to mind : 
impressions, discourses, feelings, voices, visual scenes, or anything else ». Then we 
made, like in the previous study, an explicitation interview, followed by the use of 
priming cues of the meeting. 
The analysis of the interviews indicates the following results : 
Both of the participants remember the physical context of the meeting, that is the 
place, the room and, more or less precisely, how were the persons seated around the 
table. 
They also recall the global structure of the meeting : first individual 
presentations by each of the colleagues, then a discussion to find common topics or 
notions of the team and, at the end, a discussion to find the topic of the future 
conference that they will organize. 
Concerning the content of the interactions, as we will develop below, S1 
retrieves very little of it, when S2 retrieves mainly what he said during the meeting 
and what were the reactions to his discourse.  
But both of the interviewed participants retrieve the intervention of a colleague, 
even if they give a different (and quasi opposite) meaning and appreciation to this 
intervention : 
 
S1 was marked by this proposition because he thought it was out of tone and 
self-centered ; S1 says : 
S1 : « Later we discuss the title of the conference and the topic which could 
be federative, and then his interventions are « we could do a conference on... », 
then something which is totally only in his own domain, totally specialized, on 
(says the topic in a few words)
7
... (laughes) then you see, what is striking it’s not 
that it’s not interesting, but it’s against the current, the general tendency to find 
federative topics, his proposal is not at all federative (...) it creates a rupture ! »  
Whereas S2 remembers it very differently, as a good proposition which had not 
much impact whereas it was a research topic shared by everyone : 
S2 : « I remember a proposal which was not retained, the one of Y who 
proposed a conference on (topic a) ; since we all study (topic a), well, at least as 
a tool (...) even if we study it with different fields and issues, our common 
characteristic is that we work, not only but mainly on (topic a). »  
                             
7 For respecting the anonymity of the subjects, we erased the precise wordings of the 
proposals. 
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Another element that both remembered was the interventions of a new colleague, 
A, who appeared to intervene a lot and to take an important place in the team.  
S1 says : 
S1 : « I remember that he used very respectful terms to describe us (...) ; then 
he has been the object of alliances (...) though until then we didn’t know how he 
would position  himself ; alliances from B, R, F ; not G ; me too I think, by 
saying how his proposal was extremely dynamic and how it was interesting for 
us to look at this type of extremely opened theory. »  
Here are the only common memories linked to the verbal content, but still with 
different points of views on a same event. We will now look at the specific 
recollectioins or omissions of each subject. 
Subject 1 
The utterance that S1 said about A (cf previous extract) is the only verbal content 
that he can recall of the meeting. He cannot remember the topics discussed after 
concerning the axis or the conference. He says himself that he does not remember 
discourses but that he recalls only strategies, positionings, stakes : 
S1 : « but you know, that’s difficult for me to remember discourses, I rarely 
recall them ; I remember strategies, positionings, strikes, perspectives, it’s often 
that (...) I remember the strikes, the general progress, some directions, and what 
will happen after ; when P speaks I think : here actually I think we can work 
together or : I will propose him that ; at the same time I observe the general 
orientation of the laboratory and how I’m positioned in it. »  
When I give S1 prompting cues of the topics which have been discussed as 
proposals for the conference during the meeting, he describes the uncertainty of his 
remembering of the exchanged content, and his description corresponds  exactly to 
the process of remembering via inferences that Herrmann [HER 94] opposes to 
direct remembering. It is striking to notice how the persons we interviewed are most 
of the time able to distinguish when they have a direct access to the past event and 
when they rationalize by inferring and associating. 
For instance I asked S1 : « do you remember that at some point the group 
discussed about (topic)» and he answered « yes it could be Y who proposed that 
topic » 
but then he adds spontaneously : 
S1 : « here I’m conscious that you ask me about the fuzzier part of my 
memory, and probably that’s where there is a huge gap between what really 
happened and was said, and what I can remember today ; here my thought is 
more based on the principle of association, so I make associations with the risk 
that it’s very fuzzy ; the logic of association itself is not fuzzy, I do attribute a 
discourse to such person because he is working on such topic and I can imagine 
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that they talked about it at some point... but with the risk to be wrong and trapped 
by a representation that I already have. » 
 
Subject 2 
Concerning S2, the verbal content he remembers is mainly when he intervened 
and how the others reacted. He remembers for example three discussions where he 
was implicated, for instance : 
S2 : « - There were discussions about the research axis, I remember that at 
first when we defined axis which I don’t remember the precise wording, I found 
that I was a bit out of that ; well it was my impression ; maybe I was wrong but 
my feeling was that my work could not be framed in the proposal ; I remember I 
relaunched the discussion and there were interventions from T, V, etc, so M and 
N also, and we could fix the two axis of the laboratory (..) I remember that I 
said : « personally, stated like that , these two axes, I don’t fit my work easily in 
these axes » ; that was (topic) and something else ; except if we enlarge it a lot ; 
and after I said that it would not impeed me doing what I’m doing [...] we 
defined two other axes and like that, for me, it was federative ; what I’m doing 
may fit in one or the other axis.  
- do you remember the axis ? 
- no I can’t, I told you before, no » 
 
We can see how S2 remembers what is said « around » his interventions in these 
three examples which correspond to the parts of the interview where he recalls the 
content of the discussions. 
He also remembers some precise wordings of the propositions for the 
conference, but not much, and like for S1, the prompting cues of the proposals 
discussed does not help him, there is no recognition of the verbal content. 
To conclude, like in the slogan design study, S1 remembers better, after several 
months, the positionings and argumentative structure of the interaction than the 
verbal content of the proposals, even if once again in this interactive situation, the 
goal of the meeting is to find scientific topics, that is, a verbal object (like for the 
slogan design situation). The exchanges are then motivated and focused on verbal 
contents but still, these are massively forgotten. Like for the slogan design, we 
observe inter-individual differences, S2 remembering more of the discursive content 
when he was himself active in the discussion. This study also shows the different 
memory that S1 and S2 have about what was said during the meeting. 
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5.1.2. Sanchiz’ study of administrative meetings recalls 
Sanchiz in his study of the dynamics of administrative meetings (Sanchiz, in 
progress), also found a massive forgetting of the verbal content of the interaction in 
a natural situation of work with a lower delay of remembering. 
He could notice that in the meetings of a documentation service of a large French 
company (Electricity of France) the participants had, only one month after the 
meeting, a very partial memory of the content of the discussions. These meetings 
occured every month, but the last one before the meeting studied was three months 
ago. In the meeting studied, nine participants were informing each other and solving 
problems by taking decisions; the director of the meeting was the director of the 
service and she was organizing the exchanges.  
Thirty three different topics have been discussed during the meeting. 
Six of the participants have been interviewed one month later and asked about 
the topics which were discussed during the meeting ;  they could only mention one, 
two or three of them ; the one being the most remembered was the new place where 
they should work in the near future.  
This study indicates how the content of the discussions in this natural work 
setting may be rapidly forgotten since the meeting was only one month before the 
recall (a typical delay between these administrative meetings) ; most of the 
participants were active in the discussion in taking a decision, but still they cannot 
remember the most global units of the verbal content, that is, the topics (which is 
more global than the arguments or information exchanged on each topic). 
5.2. Distorted memory of an agent-client interaction 
We will describe now a case which indicates how, immediately after the 
interaction, a participant may have a very distorted representation of the past 
dialogue. 
In a study about the mutual understanding of agents advising clients on financial 
products at LaPoste and AXA [CAH 98a], the interactions between the agents and 
the clients were audio-recorded and the agents were interviewed just after the 
interaction.  In one of the interviews we can see how the memory of the agent 
transforms the collective event. 
In the following post-verbalization, she talks about a misunderstanding which, 
according to her memory of the event, occured during the interaction with her client 
because she thinks she did not answer the client's question but continued to develop 
her argument on another topic. 
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Interview of the agent 
Agent : "-… to one question I replied something else to her, on the subject of 
tax reductions, I said to her "you put 4000F" and all, and I talked about product 
V, and at one point she said to me "how long does it last?", so she stuck with tax 
reduction and I continued with product V, I saw that I had disconnected, I 
continued with what I wanted to say to her, and all of a sudden I said to myself 
"she's talking to me about something else", and I even ask myself if I replied to 
her once I had finished (laughs), I just carried on regardless (...) I don't know if 
she realised it, I haven't a clue, perhaps she did all the same since she followed 
her own line of reasoning so she must have/ I don't know whether she mightn't 
have said to herself "oh goodness me what's she talking to me about, that's not 
what I asked her for", perhaps she realised it (louder) yes because when I came 
back to it afterwards, when I said to her "yes but it's during 8 years", she said to 
me "yes, that's what I was asking you" (she laughs) so it's true that..." (she 
laughs) … 
 
She then has this representation of a misunderstanding which was due to her 
imperfect listening and she feels at fault.  
In fact, when we look at the actual dialog we see that her representation is very 
distorted and subjective, since there was no misunderstanding at all : in the real 
dialogue, the agent was talking about the tax cuts when the client asked a question 
about the product V and the agent answered her almost instantaneously. In her recall 
she believes that she changed the subject with product V and while the client asks a 
question about the tax cuts she does not answer her, or answers later. 
How can we explain this distorted memory of the agent ? We may propose three 
hypotheses, but her memorization process will remain unobservable : 
1° - this client intervened very rarely and during the whole interaction only asked 
three questions; maybe the agent retained this question as a sign of understanding 
difficulty from the client. 
2° - a phone call interrupted the dialog at this phase; maybe the agent 
remembered from this interruption a feeling of a break, of a gap. 
3° - the agent was not completely at ease with this situation of recorded dialogs 
and follow-up interviews; she was not very self-confident and was consequently a 
bit reluctant to do the study; when we ask her if there has been any difficulties with 
mutual understanding during the interaction, a vague feeling of probably having 
failed could be sufficient for her mind to reconstruct the dialog in this way. This 
would thus show how the memory process of an emotive person can transform what 
actually happened. 
The main observation is this enormous gap between the reality of the recorded 
dialog and the subjective representation that the agent has built of what happened 
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during the interaction. It is most improbable that the client has a memory of the 
interaction reconstructed in the same way as the agent. Though we would not like to 
generalize this result since we saw in the slogan design study that reconstruction and 
distortions are not so frequent. This case is just a nice example of the way the 
immediate recall may be a transformation of the reality of the cooperation. We can 
also assume that the explicitation interviews used for the slogan design and the 
scientific meeting (but not for this agent-client interaction) avoid the recall 
distortions by helping the subject to recall progressively and vividly the past 
situation. 
6. Conclusion 
Mutual understanding and decision-making are central in cooperation and are 
complex because of the uncertainty of mutual understanding and the unpredictability 
of the others’ behaviour. The complexity increases with chronic cooperation, when 
people work together regularly, since the memory of the cooperation history is 
susceptible to augment the heterogeneity between the actors, the differences 
between their cognitive contexts.  
The issue was here to look at the memory of cooperative interactions in different 
situations and with different delays : what is recalled and by who ? 
The surprising result is the easy recall of the discursive content of the interaction 
in a very short delay, and the near impossibility to recall it after a long delay: even if 
we observed some inter-individual differences, not much of the content was 
retrieved, and only after a long and cautious interview. The relational dynamics of 
the interaction (positionings, roles, interactional structure...) and the emotional 
context are more easily recalled than the verbal content.    
We have already stressed the importance of the « interactional positionings » in 
the dynamics of cooperative design decisions [CAH 98c], that is the roles and 
attitudes concerning our engagement and position, and this study indicates that they 
are still accessible after a long temporal delay. 
 The difficulty to retrieve the verbal content does not seem to be linked to the 
cognitive treatment during the cooperative interaction, but more to the long-term 
recollection since in the design dialogs, the subjects, just after the interaction, recall 
a lot of the verbal content  
One explanation of the fact that the verbal content is difficult to remember may 
be that schemas cannot help its recall. We cannot anticipate the on-going course of a 
verbal interaction. We saw that even the priming cues of the dialogue, like « did you 
talk about topic Y ? », do not help the long-term recollection of the propositional 
content (but it helps the short-term recall).  
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Still the fact that the interactional structure and positionings are better recalled 
indicates that they are salient and important during the interaction since the salient 
events are generally better recalled [BAD 90]. Though, studies on cooperative 
processes often ignore this important social and identitary dimension of any work 
situation. 
It  is important to notice that the subjects are aware of their forgettings and do 
not invent a new verbal content, at least when we use a specific interview technique. 
The subjects rarely construct something which did not happen (except the example 
of the agent, but it was a classic interview). They tend to be aware of what they have 
forgotten. For instance S1, when he tends to recover inferentially, to find a plausible 
memory, knows that he is doing that. We can consider this consciousness of the 
memory limits and accuracy as a meta-memory  ability, but we insist on the 
importance of the mode of questioning : the more the subjects’ memory is 
questioned in a very direct and rapid way, the more they will tend to rationalize and 
recover inferentially. The methodology of interview is crucial and tricky for 
obtaining reliable results, and the point is not to influence the memory course in a 
sense or another. The explicitation interview technique [VER 94] allows the 
interviewer to follow the subject’s episodic memory. 
The conclusion we can draw  for Design Rationale is that tracing the design 
decisions must be done as soon as possible after the design meetings (or better 
during the meetings) if one wants to have a reliable recall of the verbal content 
exchanged. Hoping to get participants recalling the verbal exchanges of meetings 
which took place several months ago seems unrealistic.  
We focused here on the complexity of communicative processes in cooperative 
interactions, on the heterogeneity and discrepancies which make it impossible to 
anticipate and to model because of  the various factors influencing the course of an 
interaction. For cooperating efficiently, people need to know what is the limit of 
their common ground and to forget the illusion of reciprocity; the difficulty to 
remember the verbal content of the interactions increases the difficulty to have a 
precise idea of the common ground, and people working together would probably 
gain in being aware of these potential discrepencies and in avoiding the illusion of 
reciprocity when cooperating. 
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